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Introduction: from conflict to unstable consensus 
 
The debate on the future of the public pension system –including the contributory, 
obligatory and pay-as-you-go systems– became almost twenty years ago the debate par 
excellence on the Welfare State in Spain, being at the same time an object of consensus 
and conflict between political and social forces. This is due to three fundamental reasons: 
firstly, because this debate condenses almost all the political problems as regards the 
future of social protection in Spain; secondly, because it is a permanent object and corner 
stone in the negotiations between the government, the trade unions and company 
representatives; finally, it is one of the most important vectors involved in the structuring 
of Spanish public opinion which at present, however, largely supports the existence of a 
pay-as-you-go pension  system. 
 
The ‘permanent’ reform of the public pension system began during the democratic era 
with the Law No. 26/1985 Urgent Measures for the Rationalisation of the Structure and 
Protective Action of Social Security. The reaction of trade unions towards this law was 
the first general strike of the democracy against the first socialist government. This 
required an adjustment to or stricter enforcement of the regulations for access to the 
pension system, a cut in pension costs and the refusal of the socialist government to apply 
a law of non-contributory pensions that would compensate for the negative effects of the 
reform. 
 
The 1985 reform began two processes that have been moving, until today, in a slow but 
continuous manner: on the one hand, a process of financial adjustment was put into place 
in order to reduce the cost of pensions in the long term, to toughen the access conditions 
and bring the proportion between the workers’ contribution and the pensions they receive 
closer together; on the other hand, and what is perhaps most important, ideological 
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conditions and legal and institutional tools will be constructed to favour complementary 
private pension systems. Both processes could, in time, result in a three-polar pension 
system: an assistance system (basic and financed by general taxes), a professional or 
contributory system (financed by contributions) and a private system (financed by 
individual or joint savings). 
 
The main concern of the political debate since 1985 to the present day has been focused 
on the alternative between the reformed maintenance of the pay-as-you-go system or its 
transformation into a capitalisation system (public or private). The debate and the 
negotiations are not able to prevent this ideological and institutional transition from 
taking place, in favour of an obligatory mixed system (half pay-as-you-go and half 
capitalisation) that could be heading towards a future obligatory system of private 
investments. 
 
Even if the privatisation of the actual state system is rejected by Spanish society and the 
pensioners themselves, a slow but inexorable acceptance of the inevitability of some sort 
of privatisation is taking place. This is the result of the alarm created during the period 
1990–1995 due to the supposed bankruptcy of the state system and the media campaign 
led by the economic groups interested in the creation of pension models as in Chile. 
 
Given the fact that any radical change in the pension system would implied an economic 
risk (the financing of the transition) and it would be the source of potential political 
conflicts (two general strikes have already taken place), it seems plausible to think that 
during the present decade, we will have to choice between two options mentioned before: 
a) the maintenance of the pay-as-you-go system but with continuous reform in favour of a 
greater capitalisation; or b) a slow transition towards a mixed system, of pay-as-you-go 
and capitalisation. For some, this would be the model of political equilibrium. For others, 
a transition towards inevitable and complete privatisation. A mixture of both (a and b) 
options could be an alternative, which is the thesis of this paper. 
 
To justify this thesis the following steps will be taken: firstly, a description of the 
evolution of the state pension system will be made with the aid of some basic indicators. 
Also, the main reforms that have taken place since 1985 until 2001 will be described, as 
well. Secondly, the political and economic debate which has arisen from the positions 
taken by the fundamental actors in the pension problem, will be described: the 
government, trade unions, employers organisations, political parties and think tanks. 
Finally, different political options in question concerning the future of the pension system 
and the possible tendencies in the medium term will be established. The agreement on the 
reform of the system is unanimous amongst all the social and political forces but its 
objectives and the possibilities of reaching them differ considerably. This is what we 
intend to show with the following. 
 
 
The evolution between the pensions system between 1985–2001: situation and 
reforms 
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Evolution of the Spanish pension system 
In order to understand the importance and the achievements of the successive political 
agreements and the different legislative reforms which the public pension system has 
suffered in Spain, it is necessary to be familiar with its evolution and its main 
characteristics of coverage and protective intensity as well as the demographic and 
economic factors which affect its survival.  
 
Firstly, the present pension model in Spain is a public system with two subsystems: 
a) The contributory system, which in turn has two levels. The most important -and 
which focuses all of the political debate- is the contributory system of social security, 
financed by social contributions from workers and employers. In addition, there exists 
the pension system of civil servants, which has never been the object of discussion 
(known as the passive classes system); 
 
b) The non-contributory or social assistance system, financed by general taxes, under the 
control of social security and managed by the CCAA (Autonomous Communities). It 
provides benefits to people over sixteen year olds unable to work, people suffering 
from chronic illnesses or those who at sixty-five have not covered the minimum 
contributions to receive a full pension.  
 
Although both systems will be referred to, we will focus almost exclusively on the 
contributory system of social security as it almost entirely monopolises the political 
debate. 
 
As can be seen in table 1, over the last twenty years there has been a very significant 
increase in the number of social security pensions. One could say that the public pension 
system reached its institutional maturity in the 90s, to the extent that in 1980 the 
relationship between the active population and pensioners was 2.5 social security 
members and in the year 2000 the number was 1.7. The number of contributory pensions 
has practically doubled in twenty years mainly due to the fact that the 80s were a period 
of huge increase. This huge increase was due to the following factors: an acceleration of 
the ageing process of the Spanish population (in 1980 11% of the population was 65 or 
over and in 2000 this figure increased to 16.8%), the adjustments made by hundreds of 
thousands of industrial workers, the early retirement of hundreds of thousands of farmers, 
the incorporation of organisations which were previously not included in social security 
(Telefonica, ONCE) and an increase in early retirement (i.e. retiring before the age of 65: 
60-70% of pensioners belonging to the social security general regime retire before the 
age of 65, and around 40% retire at the age of 60). These factors explain the 4% average 
inter-annual increase in the number of pensioners during the 80s. During the 90s this 
process slowed down and settled at an increase of around 2%, which is a value just about 
half of that found in the previous decade. In this sense, everything seems to indicate that 
we have entered into a period of relative stability in terms of the increase in the number 
of pensioners. This will last until the beginning of the next decade when the demographic 
factor will again have an intense effect on the situation due to the retirement of the 
population born in the 1950s and onwards. It is also important not to forget that the 
universalisation process of social security and of the pension system in Spain took place 
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in the 1980s. The consolidation of political democracy, the economic crisis and the 
acceleration of the ageing process of the population are, in effect, the reasons behind this 
extensive and intense rise in the number of pensions. The coverage of elderly population 
by contributory pension system shows the near total universalization. 
 
On the other hand, the increase in pension costs has settled to a value that is around 10% 
of the GDP (see table 1). It has even tended to decrease slightly due to the combined 
effect of a strong increase in the GDP, superior to the cost of pensions and to the 
moderating effects of the reforms which began in 1985; in other words, due to the 
reduction in the protective intensity. However, there are factors in the increase in pension 
costs which explain the traditional increase in pension costs such as: compensating 
effects due to inflation, the increase in value of new pensions which are moving closer to 
real salaries and, lastly, the supplements to pensions which benefit minimum pensions 
above and beyond their contributions (a third of pensions are made up of these 
supplementary benefits especially widows’ pensions 44%, orphans’ pensions 48% and 
retirement 33%). 
 
Regarding the non-contributory pensions, Law No. 26/1990 on Non-contributory 
pensions consist in an ordering and rationalisation of the previous systems (FAS, LISMI) 
which are condemned to extinction. At present, the new system protects a population of 
about 700,000 people, whom 40% of them are the elderly. The amount they receive is 
about 45% of the minimum wage and its aim is to aid social integration and the battle 
against poverty. The financing involved was, until now, confused, through taxes and 
contributions from social security. Since the year 2000, the financing has been through 
general taxes applying the Pact of Toledo (1995) on pensions. 
 
In short, the maturing process of the public pension system is the consequence of the 
following factors: demographic factors (ageing), economic factors (the restructuring of 
the Spanish industrial and agricultural systems) and institutional factors (the ordering and 
rationalisation of the current systems). The understanding of these factors demand a 
further analysis taking into account that the pressures on pensions in Spain, as in other 
South European countries, will be not fully felt until 2020 onwards, when dependency 
ratios will be one of the highest in the EU countries. 
 
1. Demographic factor: the evolution of Spanish population (see table 2) in the next 
coming decades will change sharply the structure of age groups. Although the 
working population will grow until a percentage of 63 between all ages, the crucial 
fact is that the percentage of people older than 65 will grow up to 32.5 by year 2050, 
while population groups between 0-14 will decrease down from 26.2 per cent in 1950 
to 13.6 in year 2050. In global terms, the general dependency rates will start to 
worsen from the third decade of this century. 
 
2. Economic growth factor: the prospects of economic performance are not easy to 
project because there are complex factors playing as work productivity, evolution of 
real wages, rates of inflation and employment and the size and structure of working 
population. However, in the Spanish case, there is a general agreement between 
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experts to project the future evolution of pension according to rates of GDP growth 
between 2 and 2.5%. 
 
3. Normative or institutional factor: as it has been mentioned above, the most relevant 
restructuring social protection policy in Spain from 1980 until now has been that 
related to pensions system. Although there are wide disagreements between political 
parties on the role that privatization should play, there has been until now a basic 
consensus about the permanent rationalization of present pay-as-you-go system. All 
political and social actors are agreed that ageing is not only the argument or pressure 
factor on contributory pensions system. There are other factors such as replacement 
rates, the average level of benefit in new pensions compared with those deceased, or 
the minimum period of contribution for a pension. All reforms from 1985 until the 
Pact of Toledo have been driven to intensify the actuarial element of pay-as-you-go 
system at the cost of redistribution policy, improving transparency and greater equity 
between different contributory regimens. 
 
To all these factors can be added to those processes which started at 1985, mentioned at 
the beginning of the report: the first is the ideological ascent of privatisation in Spanish 
society led by business groups belonging to banking and insurance schemes which have 
the capacity to modify the public vision of the future of social security. The second is the 
conversion of the pension reform into state politics based on consensus and negotiation 
between political, social and economic agents. These last two factors are essential in 
understanding the reforms that shall be analysed next. 
 
Nevertheless, all these factors have been interpreted in different ways when elaborating 
long-term projections for the next decades. That means different interpretations on the 
number of pensions, its money value and the number of years that pensions are received, 
could evolve. Some projections (Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, Union 
CCOO and also BBVA) have concluded recently that is possible to guarantee the present 
pay-as-you-go system with some reforms that widen the period or years of contribution 
and intensify the actuarial nature of pensions. According to the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Affairs projection the social spending on contributory pensions could grow up 
from a maximum of 10.78 per cent of GDP in year 2030 to a minimum of 8.78 (present 
percentage in year 2000), in base to an economic growth of GDP between 2.7 and 2 per 
cent (see Table 3). Other projections are rather catastrophic, as those made by Circulo de 
Empresarios (an entrepreneurs association) which have been demonstrated not to be 
credible. There are other projections (the saving bank La Caixa) that demand a deep 
transformation of pay-as-you-go system into another of mix kind, that is, a contributory 
system with two levels: a basic pay-as-you-go pension and a second occupational tier 
based on capitalisation of individual contributions. 
 
The permanent reform of the public pension system 
The financial adjustment caused by the Law of Pensions of 1985 and the subsequent 
social conflicts -the general strikes of June 1995 and December 1988- convinced the 
socialist government that a pact was required between political forces. So pension reform 
was in fact a state problem beyond the electoral competition between political parties. 
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Hence the Pact of Toledo of April 1995 was implemented. This pact was an obligatory 
and enforced one. It was obligatory because given the ample popular support for a public 
pension system; its treatment as partisan political material steered towards unforeseeable 
electoral costs. It was also a ‘forced’ pact because it was the result of a precarious and 
provisional agreement beneath which lie profound divergent opinions and conflicts 
regarding the nature of the political reform to be carried out on pensions. 
 
In any case, the Pact of Toledo includes the legitimisation of the adjustment policies that 
took place between 1985 and 1995. For some, (trade unions and the socialist party) these 
policies seem directed at making the public pay-as-you-go system financially viable 
through measures of greater proportionality between the contribution made and the 
pension received. They also believe these policies aim to obtain greater equality between 
the subsystems of social security, as well as a clear separation in the financing of 
contributory and supplementary benefits. However, for others (employers and the 
majority of the PP) these policies are viewed as temporary reforms which should 
inevitably lead to private system in the future, the reasons which will subsequently be 
discussed.  
 
In table 4, the legislative reforms and the national agreements made on the subject of 
pensions have been described in a schematic manner. From succinct analysis of the 
mentioned table, several conclusions and tendencies can be extracted on the subject of 
institutional reform: 
 
Law No. 26/1985, the Pact of Toledo of 1995 and the Law of Consolidation and 
Rationalisation of 1997 (which develops the Government-Trade Union Pact of 1996) 
strengthen the contributory or capitalisation character of the public pension system as 
well as correct some of the imbalances between these systems. In any case, the minimum 
period one must contribute in order to receive a pension has increased from 10 to 15 
years, calculation of the pension is now 8 instead of 2 years and access to invalidity 
pensions is controlled.  
 
When the Law of 1987 on Private Plans and Funds was established, private plans and 
funds, to complement pensions, began very early on. The Law of Ordination and 
Supervision of Private Insurance strengthened this tendency in two ways in 1995. One 
way was ideological (catastrophic visions of what social security was to become). The 
other way was about taxation (progressive increase in tax deductions in order to promote 
private saving pensions). In consequence there has been a spectacular increase in 
complementary pension funds (from 1% of the GDP in 1990 to 5% in 2000; from 
320,000 participants in 1990 to 3,510,000 in 2000. In other words, from 2.5% of the 
working Spanish population to 26%). Positive tax incentives and the high financial yields 
obtained from the stock exchange during the second half of the 1990s are the factors 
behind this selective privatisation of the pension system, which is at present modifying 
the financial and ideological base of the public pension system. 
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In short, the two factors doing battle in the reform of the public pension system are the 
rationalisation of the present pension system through political pacts and the growing 
privatisation in a context of ideologically (un)stable political consensus. 
 
However, due to the support given by the vast majority of the public to the pension 
system, no government is prepared to adopt radical measures of privatisation. In all these 
debates is always the political pragmatism (from the government, political parties and 
trade unions) and the economic realism (from the bank and insurance companies) which 
direct reform towards mixed solutions. 
 
In fact, the most feasible recommendations from the Pact of Toledo (which strengthens 
the contributory system and supports the idea of greater equality and solidarity) have 
been developed. However, there are other politically acceptable proposals which are 
constantly being postponed, such as the reform of the special regimes of social security 
which produce deficits, or the financing of incentives to create employment through 
contributions and not through taxes. On the other hand, there are others that are already 
under way, such as the separation of financial sources for contributory and support 
pensions, and the constitution of a Pension Reserve Fund (which was already foreseen in 
the Law of Social Security of 1963). 
 
 
The political debate on the future of the public pension system: consensed reforms 
versus privatisation 
 
The neoliberal proposals favouring privatisation have, for the moment, had relative 
success in Spain. The 90s saw the almost complete privatisation of the public business 
sector. At the same time, the contracting out of services or the privatisation of 
management has undergone a selective development that has been important in sectors 
such as health and personal social services. The private management of benefits for 
professional illness or the liberalisation of employment and professional orientation 
services are both examples of this tendency of selective privatisation adopted by the 
welfare state. 
 
As regards the pension system, we have already seen the pragmatic process of reform that 
has been taking place as a result of a delicate political equilibrium and the solid 
institutionalisation of social security. These factors prevent any attempts at radical 
privatisation reform even if it seems that maintaining the status quo is not viable. 
 
In Spain, the debate on the pension system has various main characters, as has already 
been mentioned, which have different strengths and influences. Their basic ideas shall be 
considered in the following: 
 
The trade unions 
The defence of the social protection system, and in particular, of the pension system, has 
not only given new content to trade union action in Spain, (focused until 1985 on the 
collective negotiation on the subject of salaries), but has also permitted the unity of trade 
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unions between 1988 (second general strike led by the two great trade unions, CCOO and 
UGT, in favour of social change) and April 2001 (UGT did not sign the 1996 agreement 
for the Improvement and Development of the Social Protection system). 
 
Trade union policies have been characterised, with regard to pensions, by two features: 
firstly, they have assumed salary moderation as a permanent practice in exchange for the 
maintenance and perfecting of the social protection system. Secondly, they have agreed 
strategic defence of the present pension pay-as-you-go system, in exchange for 
strengthening its contributory aspect and tolerating the development of private 
complementary pension systems. 
 
Agreements between trade unions have not always been unanimous. Between the 
absolute agreement on the Trade Unions Platform, which justified the resounding success 
of the general strike in December 1998, and the disagreement on the content of the 
Government-CCOO pact in 2001, there stretches a long period of time in which pensions 
have constituted one of the fundamental focus points in trade union actions. 
 
Finally, the unity of the trade unions deteriorated when UGT refused to sign the 
Agreement of April 2001. The differences lie in the interpretation of the fulfilment of the 
compromises taken from the Agreement of 1996 and in the absence of deadlines for their 
achievement. 
 
The employers 
The attitude of employers towards the Pact of Toledo and its development has always 
been distrustful, calculated and strategic. It has always been ‘calculated’ because its 
priority has been almost exclusively the reduction of contributions companies have to 
make to social security, (under the argument that they are too expensive and they do not 
contribute to the creation of employment). This position has been manifested in their 
distancing from the Pact of Toledo and their withdrawal from the Agreement of 1996. 
The participation in the Agreement of 2001 together with the CCOO and the government 
was in response to the reduction of social contributions. It has been ‘distrustful’ because 
the Agreements could suppose an increase in social expense and a consolidation of the 
present pay-as-you-go system. Finally, the attitude has always been ‘strategic’ because it 
favours the transformation of the actual pay-as-you-go system into another system (the 
private type). All their political efforts and media campaigns have always progressed in 
this direction.  
 
The government and the political parties 
The strategy adopted by the political parties, in view of their experience during the period 
1985-95 and the popular support for the public pension system, has been headed in order 
to make the subject of pensions non-electoral but the object of political consensus. The 
Pact of Toledo marks the starting point of the strategy. There has always existed a great 
sense of precaution towards the electoral consequences that could derive from a political 
treatment of pensions. Even though the different Agreements have committed themselves 
to the revaluation of pensions according to the expected inflation, as an inflation control 
system, the truth is that since 1996 there have been two re-assessments taking into 
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account past inflation. The PP government has not allowed pension matters to take away 
electoral support. 
 
This does not mean to say that political parties do not hold their own positions and views 
on the future of the pension system. Whilst the PSOE (socialists) and the IU (left-wing 
coalition) defend the pay-as-you-go system, the PP and CIU (the Catalan Nationalist 
Party) defend a mixed system in which private or investment pensions are preferred. This 
usually appears in their electoral campaigns. However, political strategies are 
subordinated to those of the electoral type. Any reform adopted, should be implemented 
slowly and with respect a fair proportion of acquired rights. Any alteration of present 
political equilibrium with respect to pensions would break one of the most important 
consensus of the Spanish democracy.  
 
The experts 
By experts we refer to think tanks that depend on financial entities. In Spain there are 
three groups of thought that defend the necessity of a mixed system; two foundations 
belonging to financial entities (the BBVA and the Caixa-FEDEA) and a business 
institution (el Círculo de Empresarios). Basically there are three arguments which these 
groups of important academic and political influence sustain; firstly, the demographic 
perspectives of the Spanish population for 2050. This year is supposed to be experienced 
a radical deterioration of the relationship between taxpayers and pensioners and will 
subsequently cause a large increase in pension expenses (15% of the GDP) and the social 
security deficit (5.96% of the GDP in 2050). Secondly, the option of immediately moving 
on to a private system. This alternative would be politically rejected by the Spanish 
society and the economic expense involved in the transition would be very high (2.5 of 
the GDP). Thirdly, a mixed pension choice (in line with those existing in the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Holland, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden). In other words, it would 
imply three different types of pension: the minimum state benefit; obligatory professional 
pension plans of capitalisation up to at least 50% of the salary, the rest being of pay-as-
you-go or voluntary; and lastly, free, individual pension plans. 
 
Therefore, according to experts, it is necessary a (large) process of transition towards a 
mixed system -of capitalisation and pay-as-you-go-. The characteristics of this mixed 
system are the object of debate. For some of the experts, the present system should be 
maintained until maximum adaptation between contributions and pensions were 
achieved. Meanwhile, for others, it is a question of trying to establish a mixed system in 
which the pay-as-you-go section would be within social security but not the capitalisation 
system. Finally, for the representatives of insurance companies the mixed model it is only 
a transition which should lead to a clearly private system that would still maintain state 
pensions for those who have not covered the minimum contributions to receive a full 
pension. 
 
In any case, it should not be forgotten that the projections made by the experts are always 
tentative when not wrong. For example, consider the fact that the BBVA Foundation 
projected the social security deficit for the year 2000 at 1.65% of the GDP and the figure 
for the Fedea-Fundación (La Caixa Foundation) would be 2.7% of the GDP. These are 
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forecasts that went wrong. Note that, since 1999, the social security system has been 
generating surpluses that are being used to constitute Pension Reserve Funds. 
 
The debate on future pensions system between political and social actors, very briefly 
described, shows how financial and political constraints are playing at the same time. All 
actors are agreed that pension system is facing a crucial challenge. Also there is an 
agreement on relevance of demographic and financial factors. The latter underlies in 
continuous rationalization reforms which are trying to get a more actuarial and viable 
system. However the problem of pension reforms is not only a financial viability of 
present contributory system; it is also a problem of distribution of power between 
political actors. The strong resistance to privatization by Unions and its reluctance to the 
decreasing role of redistribution in pension policy indicates that in the coming years 
pension reforms will be in Spain a crucial political conflict. 
 
 
Reform options and possible tendencies of change 
 
Throughout this report we have analysed the problems surrounding the Spanish pension 
system and the different reform alternatives. It is now fitting to point out these 
alternatives and the possibility of their achievement. 
 
Basically, there are three crucial alternatives that are available to deal with the 
problematic future of the pension system: 
 
1. Reformed maintenance of the pay-as-you-go system. This is the option defended by 
trade unions and left wing parties, along with the government, this last by now. It 
involves perfecting the pay-as-you-go system, strengthening its contributory nature, 
its economic efficiency and its internal solidarity. This option assumes the existence 
of private pension systems as a complement. 
 
2. Privatisation of the pension system. Employers have defended this option since the 
late 80s. Nowadays it is an alternative strategy at long term once certain transition 
requirements have been met. Even though it is not a politically operative option, it is 
a permanently active ideological choice. 
 
3. Mixed pension system. This option has ample support from employers and think 
tanks. The aim is to apply a ‘three-legged’ system in the short–medium term: a basic 
state support system; an individual or joint saving or private plan system; and, which 
is the most important, the occupational type with two levels: the first one is a basic 
pension in terms of pay-as-you-go system, the second is an occupational pillar which 
in the long run would be the determinant tier. 
 
The political struggle is between options A and C. The first option, the pay-as-you-go 
system, has the support of the vast majority of public opinion, left wing political parties 
and the institutional inertia of a 102 year old system. The second option, a mixed system 
of complete future professional capitalisation, has the support of the professional classes, 
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employers in general, right wing political parties, Catalan Nationalists, and of course, the 
flow in favour of reform that is taking place in different countries of the EU. 
 
As, in practice, capitalisation and pay-as-you-go offer multiple institutional 
combinations, it is fitting to think that in the present political situation in Spain, option A 
will be maintained at least until the year 2010-15, if no significant economic or 
institutional crises take place. From this year onwards, there will be new demographic 
pressures so option C will come through in a firm manner. There are latent factors in the 
Pact of Toledo and in its development –non-specified agreements– which could force 
change towards the mixed system and which are related to the zero deficit policy of the 
government or lack of commitment towards social expenditure. We refer to decisions that 
could undermine the pension system and direct civic attitudes towards privatisation 
options. For example:  
 
a) The agreed contribution increase pre-supposes a reduction in average pensions in the 
medium term and as such a reduction in the protective intensity of pensions; 
 
b) Secondly, a deterioration in the financial basis of social security, given that the state 
is reducing its financing, as for example, unemployment benefits and active policies 
are financed through social contributions, not through general taxation. 
 
c) The deadline of twelve years (starting from 1997) for minimum quantities to be 
financed by the state is too long and will financially damage social security (the latter 
finances the State, contributing to the reduction of the public deficit). On the other 
hand, two agreements reached in 2001 are firm and seem to be leading inevitably 
towards a type of mixed system, such as the reduction of company contributions from 
2002, and a study into the effects of extending the period used for regulating pension 
calculation to a full working life as of 2003 (remembering that this period went from 
two to eight years in 1985 and from eight to fifteen years in 1997). 
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Table 1: Contributory and social assistance pensions. Main figures 
 
 
Contributory 
pensions 1980        1985        1990        1995        2000 
Number of Pensions 4,398,434 5,396,517 6,187,135 7,039,678 7,664,200
% Coverage / 
 Population 65+  82 85 87 89 92
% Annual increase  22.69 14.65 13.77 8.87
Number of  Social  
Security members 
(not included the  
unemployed people) 
10,413,800 10,613,100 12,587,700 12,300,500 14,622,000
Pensions Public  
Spending to GDP  
%  Millions Euro 
5258.86 
5.77 
12,738.45
7.52
22,720.06
7.55
37,202.65 
8.50 
50,834.81
8.49
Revenue of Social  
Security  to GDP  
% Millions Euro 
9,602.97 
10.53  
15,034.32
8.87
27,348.45
9.07  
39,369.00 
8.99 
55,176.52
9.10
Monthly Pension 
(mean): New Pensions      102.88          214.48          300.33          449.69          508.93
Monthly Pension  
(mean): Outcomes                 78.79          153.54          236.02          334.94          409.44
Monthly Pension  
(mean)          91.12          171.52          267.23          382.03          468.19
Social Assistance  
pensions        1980        1985        1990        1995        2000 
Number of Pensions 342,125 350,079        523,968        675,426        622,804
Monthly Pension 
% with regard to the  
Minimum Wage 
           24.04 
  
17.5 
68,61
 
30.7
 
44.1-52.0
 
 
39.7-60.4 
         248,59
35.2-59.8
% Public spending in  
Assistance Pensions  
to GDP 
             0.13             0.18              0.35              0.40              0.33
 
Source: Own elaboration in base to Social Security Statistics. 
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Table 2: Demographic projections of Spanish population 1950-2050  
  
 
Age Groups Year 0-14 15-64 65 + Total 
1950    7,211,000    18,293,000    1,988,000    27,492,000 
1970    9,459,000    21,288,000    3,292,000    34,039,000 
2000    5,733,000    26,798,000    6,734,000    39,265,000 
2020    5,471,000    25,470,000    8,250,000    39,191,000 
2030    4,944,000    23,437,000    9,678,000    38,059,000 
2050    4,610,000    18,312,000  11,027,000    33,949,000 
% /Total 
1950          26.2        66.5         7.2               100 
1970          27.8        62.5         9.7               100 
2000          14.6        68.3       17.2               100 
2020          14.0        65.0       21.1               100 
2030          13.0        61.6       25.4              100 
2050          13.6       53.9       32.5              100 
 
Source: INE 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Projection of social contributory pension spending  2000-2030 
 
 
     Year   Number of pensions 
Average 
annual growth 
(%) in pensions
Social spending 
on pensions / 
% of the GDP  
(in base to average 
GDP growth of 
2%) 
Social spending 
on pensions / 
% of the GDP  
(in base to average 
GDP growth of 
2.5%) 
2000 7,664,000           1.9            8.49           8.49
2005 8,047,000           1.9            8.80           8.59
2010 8,508,000           1.9            9.13           8.69
2015 9,026,000           1.9            9.50           8.83
2020 9,534,000           1.9            9.83           8.91
2025 10,080,000           1.9         10.24           9.06
2030 10,694,000           1.9         10.78           9.31
 
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social (1995). 
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Table 4: Legal reforms on pensions system and main political agreements 
 
 
Reforms Origin Political and institutional outcomes 
1. Law No. 26/1985  of   
    Social Security 
    Rationalization 
Decision of Socialist 
Government. It gives rise 
to the first general strike in 
June 1985. The reform tries 
to moderate the increasing 
pension spending and to 
control invalidity pensions.
Minimum period of 
contribution to access to a 
contributory pension: 15 
years (before, 10 years); 
calculation of pension 
according to the last 8 
years worked (before, 2 
years); 
control to access to 
invalidity pensions; 
increase in value of 
pensions, in terms of future 
inflation rates. 
2. Law on Private Pension  
      System  (1987) 
This law develops new 
private pension system, 
free and complementary. 
Growing  number of  
private pension schemes. 
3. Law No. 26/1990 Non  
      Contributory  Pensions 
Second general strike in 
December 1988.  
New agreement between 
Unions and Government 
for increasing social 
spending in pensions and 
social benefits in general. 
Increase in value of  
assistance benefit pensions, 
minimum contributory  
pensions and  
unemployment benefits. 
4. Pact of Toledo, April  
1995. 
1.1 1st Phase:  
       Parliamentary Phase 
All political parties, except 
IU, agree to leave out 
pensions reform of the  
partisan debate.  
All pension reforms will be 
in an State issue under 
consensus. 
Agreement  on division 
between contributory and 
assistance revenues;  
reduction in the number of 
special regimes of Social 
Security; flexibility in 
retirement; increase in 
value of pensions; support 
to private complementary 
pension system. 
1.2 2nd Phase: October 9, 
1996 
Agreement between 
government and Unions 
(Employers’  
representatives auto  
excluded). 
Agreement developed in:  
Development of the Pact of  
Toledo: clear division 
between contributory and 
social assistance pensions. 
Law No. 24/1997  
reinforcing the contributory 
pension system;  
improvement of pensions 
in terms of past inflation. 
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Law No 24/1997 on  
Consolidation and  
Rationalization of  
Social Security 
4.3 3rd Phase: April 2001 
     Agreement between    
     Government,  
     Employers’   
     representatives (CEOE- 
     CEPYME) and the   
     Union CC.OO on social  
     protection reform. 
Development of the Pact of 
Toledo reinforcing   
the contributory nature of  
the pension system. 
Definitive division in the 
revenues between  
assistance and contributory 
systems; reserve fund of 
Social Security; new 
legislation on flexible 
retirement; increase in 
value of pensions for 
orphans, widows and 
minimum pensions;  
convergence in financing 
between general and 
special regimens of Social 
Security; 
a new commission to study 
a long-term care insurance 
system; new legal support 
to private pension system.  
 
